This paper presents an experimental investigation of the individual willingness to pay (WTP) for green electricity. The experimental design comprises a public-choice scenario and a individual-choice scenario. It involves three different payment vehicles for the public promotion of renewables: direct tax, indirect tax, and CO2 tax. We test for the extent of freeriding, the impact of different payment vehicles on individual WTP, and crowding-out effects caused by the public promotion of green electricity. Combined with data collected by means of a supplementary opinion survey, our results indicate that individuals prefer binding collective contributions rather than individual market-driven activities in this field.
Introduction
In the current debate about how to mitigate climate change most effectively, renewable energy sources are posted to play a prominent role. The use of renewable energy sources for electricity generation may be increased either directly by paying subsidies for green electricity generation, for example through feed-in tariffs as in Germany 1 , or indirectly by taxing fossil sources. The introduction of taxes 2 in order to correct for externalities is in line with the polluter-pays principle because incentives for both producers and consumers are created to avoid emissions, for instance, by switching to renewable energy sources. In contrast, paying subsidies that are financed by taxing other goods is in perfect accord with the public-pays principle. The choice between alternative approaches to support green electricity provokes the normative question of which policy measures should be taken in order to transform collective environmental objectives into individual behaviour and how the costs of improving environmental quality should be shared.
This paper provides for an answer to this question by presenting an experimental investigation of the willingness to pay for green electricity. Since the environmental impact of green electricity is consumed by the society as a whole and it is not possible to exclude certain individuals from consuming it, making the electricity system ''greener'' can be interpreted as a public good. Textbook economics would predict that private provision leads to an inefficiently low level of the public good as people can free-ride on other people's contributions (Roberts, 1987) . Likewise, the neutrality hypothesis (Bergstrom et al., 1986) holds that people perceive tax financed government grants for the support of green electricity as perfect substitutes for their own contributions. Therefore, government grants are expected to completely crowd out private spending on green electricity. 3 Recent research suggests, however, that spending on a public good like green electricity creates an extra benefit apart from the consumption of improved environmental quality, namely the so-called "warm glow of giving" (Andreoni, 1989) , that is, a direct benefit which arises from the act itself of contributing to the public good. The warm-glow effect, thus, may help to understand why people are willing to spend on green electricity at all. 4 The experimental design involves two scenarios. In the individual-choice scenario, survey participants reveal their preferred individual level of green electricity consumption,
given a specified level of public support. In the public-choice scenario, participants are asked to determine a level of green electricity to be valid for the whole society. In this scenario, the participants may be regarded as voters, with the preferred level of green electricity representing the majority vote. We will follow Champ et al. (1997) and distinguish between a participant's willingness to pay (WTP) and his or her willingness to donate (WTD). The former is elicited in the public-choice scenario and refers to the case where it is impossible to free-ride. Since the median voter determines the level of green electricity to be valid for all participants under the same treatment and the costs are shared equally, it is individually rational for each participant to state the WTP that reflects his or her true monetary valuation of green electricity, comprising of its environmental impact and the warm glow arising from the contribution itself. In the individual-choice scenario, free-riding cannot be prevented.
Ultimately, all participants consume the same environmental quality though they fix their contributions individually. Therefore, strong incentives exist to understate the willingness to spend on green electricity and to free-ride on the contributions of the other participants.
Obviously, WTP forms the upper limit for WTD. The two different scenarios allow for separating between WTP and WTD, and thus provide us with a test of the extent of free riding.
Both scenarios involve three different payment vehicles: a lump-sum tax implemented as a direct tax, an electricity tax implemented as an indirect tax, and a CO2 tax where the tax receipts are redistributed to the consumers of green electricity. The basic payoff-structure underlying the six (2 x 3) different treatments is constructed to be identical. The experimental design thus enables us to study the participants' demand behaviour for green electricity with respect to free-riding and different payment vehicles. Crowding-out effects are tested by means of a post-experimental questionnaire. Furthermore, participants are asked a set of contributions. Frey (1997) supposed that people's intrinsic or moral motivations are crowded out by external measures such as market regulation (see also Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997, and Brekke et al., 2003) . 4 See Nyborg and Rege (2003) and Garet-Varet et. al. (2000) for an overview of models explaining both the private provision of public goods and crowding-out effects of private contributions caused by public activities questions concerning their current perception of public measures in the field of renewable energy, and their attitudes towards certain normative aspects of taxation, for instance, the perceived justice of the polluter-and the public-pays principle, respectively.
Our data exhibits strong treatment effects. Under the public-choice treatments, participants are willing to pay far higher contributions to green electricity than under the individual-choice treatments. This observation highlights the large extent of free-riding in the private provision of the public good "environmental quality". We find no significant differences between the payment vehicles. Furthermore, we observe crowding-in effects for low tax rates and crowding-out effects for high tax rates. Altogether, our results suggest that individuals prefer binding collective contributions rather than individual market-driven activities in this field.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we give a description of the experiment. Section 3 states our research hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of our study. The paper concludes with some final remarks in Section 5.
The Experiment

Experimental Design
The goal of the present paper is to analyze individual demand behaviour for green electricity.
In particular, we aim at measuring the extent of free-riding caused by the public-good nature of green electricity consumption, the impact of different payment vehicles on individual spending, and the sign and strength of crowding-out effects. In order to test for free-riding, the experiment involves two different scenarios: the individual-choice scenario where the participants reveal their preferred individual level of green electricity consumption, given a specified level of public support; and the public-choice scenario, where the participants determine through majority vote the level of green electricity to be valid for the whole society. Each scenario includes three different payment vehicles for green electricity:
• a direct tax that is levied from all consumers and the revenue of which is used to subsidize green electricity;
• an indirect tax that is "hidden" in the electricity price;
• and a transfer to the consumers of green electricity, financed by a CO2 tax levied from the producers of conventional electricity, where it is assumed that taxes are to 100%
shifted forward to the consumers.
Altogether, there are six treatments (see Table 1 ). We employ a between-subjects design, that is, each participant is randomly assigned to exactly one of these treatments. Crowding-out effects are tested by means of an additional post-experimental questionnaire which will be introduced in Section 2.3. 
The item of interest is the participants' willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to donate (WTD), respectively, for green electricity. Generically, the WTP/WTD for a good or service is defined as the amount of money that renders a person indifferent between receiving the good or service and keeping the money. In all treatments, each participant acts as a price taker and starts with a given budget and a given level of publicly provided green electricity which is financed by one of the three payment vehicles mentioned above. The rationale is to allocate the budget on a composite private good (consumption) and green electricity.
A participant's preference is elicited as follows: The participant is presented the decision task displayed in Figure 1 (the figure refers to the public-choice direct-tax treatment, PD). On the top of the screen, the household size ("Haushaltsgröße") stated by the participant is given. Below, the average annual electricity consumption of the household in kW h, is
given ("Stromverbrauch"). This figure is based on standardized values used by utilities. In the boxes grouped below the label "Kalkulation" (calculation) five labels and figures are shown: "Ihr Budget" (your budget) states the household's hypothetical annual gross household budget, "Steuer" (tax) the amount of taxes that is withdrawn from the budget in order to subsidize green electricity (in the case of an indirect tax this box stays empty), "Stromrechnung" (electricity bill) the annual cost of electricity to be subtracted from the gross household budget, "Ihre Auszahung" (your payoff) the annual household budget net of taxes and electricity bill, and "Umweltspende" (contribution to the environment) the amount of money that is transferred to the account of an environmental organization (the WTP and WTD, respectively).
On the right hand side of the calculation boxes, a pie chart visualizes the current level of green-electricity generation as a percentage of total electricity generation by black (conventional electricity) and green (green electricity) sectors. Below, a scroll bar and two labelled boxes are displayed. The upper label states the share of green-electricity generation in total electricity generation as a percentage ("Ökostromanteil"). The lower label states the current price of one kW h of electricity. The figures stated on the screen are computed using the information given in Table 1 and the household-specific data listed in Table 2 . In order to illustrate the proceeding, we use a single-person household as an example. Initially, the national level of green electricity promotion is 10% ( 1 . 0 0 = a ), the producer price of conventional (fossil) electricity is assumed to be 17 = promoting green electricity rise by 992 ct. This amount is financed using one of the three payment vehicles described above: under the direct tax treatment only the tax increases, under the indirect tax treatment only the consumer prices increases, and under the CO2 tax treatment both the price and the transfer increase (see the formulas stated in Table 1 ).
Note, however, that the calculation of the cost increase is not "exact" in the sense that it does not take into account the composition of the sample as to different household sizes (implying different quantities of electricity consumption). In other words, the cost increase is calculated for every participant as if all other participants had the same household size. This proceeding was necessary for technical reasons, because it was not possible to let all 58 participants in each treatment decide simultaneously. Since the marginal cost function is increasing in the quantity of green electricity consumed, this simplification has the effect that small (large) households underestimate (overestimate) the costs of promoting green electricity at societal level. In the regression analysis reported in the results section, we therefore control for household size.
The individual-choice scenario is less complicated since the national level of green electricity is fixed at the initial value of 10%. If a participant increases the quantity of greenelectricity consumption in his or her personal electricity contract, a, the price effect is negligible at the national level. Hence, the only monetary consequence is an increase of the participant's electricity bill due to the replacement of conventional electricity by unsubsidized green electricity. The respective marginal effects are listed in the last column of Table 1 . It should be noted that the CO2 tax treatment of the individual-choice scenario is not mathematically equivalent to the other treatments as it involves smaller marginal costs of private green electricity consumption.
The Incentive Mechanism
The incentive mechanism induces our participants to reveal their true WTP or WTD. In all six treatments, the extra costs of increasing the individual or national level of green electricity consumption are stated in the box "Umweltspende" (contribution to the environment). The participants are told at the beginning that one of ten participants is randomly selected for payoff. If a participant is selected for payoff, he or she immediately receives either (if he or she is assigned to the individual-choice scenario) the amount that it listed in the field "Ihre Auszahlung" (your payoff) or (if he or she is assigned to the public-choice scenario) the amount that results from the median voter's decision. 5 The contribution to the environment is transferred to the account of an environmental organization in order to mimic the beneficial impact of consuming green electricity on the environment. Hence, the decision task involves a real trade off between a participant's own payoff to be earned in the experiment and his or her contribution to the public good "environmental quality". In the previous example, where the participant (assumed that he or she is the median voter) sets 2 . 0 0 = a , the contribution to the environment is given by the extra costs of 992 1 = g ct (9.92 €) and his or her payoff is 008 , 24 = h π ct (240.08 €).
As soon as a participant has answered all questions, the lottery, where all winner tickets have been previously determined by a random device, is started. While the losers of this lottery receive only an allowance of 5 €, winners additionally receive their payoff.
Furthermore, the participants are requested to determine the environmental organization which should receive the contribution to the environment.
6
Of course, in the experiment, it is neither possible to actually determine the nationwide level of green electricity generation nor do we offer "real" electricity contracts. Hence, the incentive mechanism is accompanied by "cheap talk", that is, participants get informed intensively about the hypothetical nature of the task. Nevertheless, they are asked to behave exactly as if the situation was real. Cheap talk has been shown to effectively eliminate hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001 ).
Altogether, 348 participants were involved in the experiment, 58 in treatments 1, 3, 4, and 6, respectively, 57 in treatment 2, and 59 in treatment 5. We paid off 1,740 € as allowances and 7,991 € to the 35 winners of the lottery. The average payoff was 23.57 €.
1,393 € were donated to environmental organizations.
2.3
The Post-experimental Questionnaire
After having finished the decision task, the participants are asked to express their attitudes and opinions concerning three groups of energy policy issues. Before answering these questions, participants are presented some basic facts in order to define the object of interest, thereby securing a common basis of information. First, addressing more general attitudes towards electricity markets, participants have to state their acceptance or denial towards the following topics: the current system to support renewable energy, the liberalization of electricity markets and the announced phasing-out of nuclear energy. Second, participants are asked three questions concerning the perceived justice of financing green electricity; who should bear the cost of green electricity (all customers, solely customers consuming non-renewable energy, or solely green electricity customers)?; who is regarded as being responsible for supporting green electricity (the market, the state, or both)?; should certain industrial consumers receive tax cuts, in order to sustain their internationals competitive position?
Third, specific aspects of the promotion of green electricity are surveyed: should more expensive electricity generation technologies receive higher subsidies?; should the financial support be harmonised among European countries?; should Germany should bear more, the same, or less costs in this field than its European neighbours.
Finally, we assess the participants' sociodemographics, including age, sex, income, education, profession and religion. All answers are fed into the computer by selecting items (e.g. based on Likert-scales) from pre-defined lists. At the bottom of each computer screen, participants are informed about the number of remaining questions. Note that, in the results section, we will only comment on those variables which prove to be significant in the statistical analysis.
Procedure
The experiment including the post-experimental questionnaire is fully computerized. The programme is handled with the computer mouse. The participants are randomly drawn visitors of shopping malls. They are offered 5 € and an additional lottery prize up to 250 € in case of taking part in a survey of about 15 minutes. Participants first draw a lottery ticket and are then briefly taught how to use the headphones and notebooks placed in the field lab consisting of five work places. All further instructions are given by headphones.
The 3-digit number imprinted on the lottery ticket determines the treatment to which the participant is assigned. Then, the participant states his or her household size. This variable enters the calculation of the participant's annual budget and electricity consumption during the experiment. Subsequently, the participant has to estimate the current share of green electricity in the total generation of electricity in Germany. On the next screen, the decision task (Figure 1 ) is presented. The decision task is followed by the post-experimental questionnaire.
Tests and Hypotheses
The participants' stated preferences for green electricity in terms of the chosen scroll-bar positions (representing a 0 in the public-choice scenario and a in the individual-choice scenario) cannot be compared directly. First, participants differ in their household sizes.
Second, the price of green electricity is held constant in the individual-choice scenario; in the public-choice scenario it is an increasing function of a 0 . Hence, moving the scroll-bar involves different monetary and environmental consequences for different participants.
Accordingly, in order to make the participants' choices comparable both between participants and between treatments, we compute their average WTP and WTD, respectively, in cents of the Euro per kW h of green electricity associated with the respective scroll-bar positions. For example, if a single-person household is assigned to treatment PD (public-choice scenario, direct tax treatment) and fixes the scroll-bar at 20 . 0 0 = a , the donation to the environment (the extra cost) of 992 cents has to be divided by 300 1500 2 . 0 = ⋅ kW h of green electricity.
This yields an average WTP of 3.31 cents per kW h of green electricity.
The experiment is designed to test for free-riding, the impact of different payment vehicles, and crowding-out effects:
• Free-riding is tested by comparing the sample means of average WTP and WTD between the scenarios. We hypothesize 0
, that is, due to the warm-glow effect the average WTD in the individual-choice scenario is greater than zero; yet due to free-riding it is smaller than the average WTP in the public-choice scenario.
• The impact of different payment vehicles is tested by comparing the sample means of average WTP and WTD, respectively, within the scenarios. Direct tax and indirect tax are modelled as mathematically equivalent implementations of the public-pays principle.
However, there is ample empirical and experimental evidence that the tax burden associated with an indirect tax is systematically underestimated compared to an equivalent direct tax (compare, for example, Sausgruber and Tyran, 2005) . This effect has been labelled fiscal illusion in the literature. 7 Accordingly, we hypothesize WTP indirect >WTP direct and WTD indirect >WTD direct , respectively.
• The CO2 tax is an implementation of the polluter-pays principle. In the public-choice scenario, it is mathematically equivalent to the direct and indirect taxes. Yet, there is an important difference: under the CO2 tax treatment, the participant receives a direct transfer for increasing the level of green electricity consumption (in order to compensate him or her for the rising electricity price); as opposed to this, under the direct tax treatment, the tax amount is directly subtracted from the participant's budget. Behavioural economics research has shown that losses "loom" larger than equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . This psychological effect is known as loss aversion. Hence, if the transfers associated with the CO2 tax are perceived as gains and the deductions involved by the direct tax are perceived as losses, we would expect WTP CO2tax >WTP direct . We will also test WTD CO2tax >WTD direct . It should be noted, however, that in the individual-choice scenario the CO2 tax cannot be designed in a mathematical equivalent way (see Section 3.2 for details). Note also that the fiscal illusion and loss aversion are expected to be less pronounced in the individual-choice scenario, where taxes and subsidies, respectively, are held constant.
• Neither in the public-choice scenario nor in the individual-choice scenario, there is exogenous variation of the tax rate. Therefore, crowding-out effects are tested indirectly by additional data collected with a post-experimental questionnaire (see Section 3.3).
Exogenous variation of the subjectively felt tax burden is introduced at the between participants level by asking them to estimate the share of electricity taxes dedicated to the subsidization of green electricity. The working hypothesis is that there is a negative correlation between the estimated tax share and the WTP and WTD, respectively, that is, we surmise that private contributions are crowded out at least partially. Note that Menges et al. (2005) found crowding in below and crowding out above a certain threshold level.
Hence, we will also test for a nonlinear relationship between subjectively felt tax burden and willingness to spend on green electricity. 
Results
A group of 20 participants (5.7% of the sample) was not willing at all to support green electricity, 76 participants (21.8%) revealed payments below 1 ct. Table 3 lists the mean values of average WTP and WTD per kW h of green electricity. In the aggregate, participants paid about 3.6 cents per kW h of green electricity. Descriptive analysis of the individual payments with respect to our (2 x 3) treatment structure shows large differences between the public-choice scenario and the individual-choice scenario: on average, WTP exceeded WTD by 5 cents. At a first glance, it seems that participants did not react comparably strong to the different payment vehicles. This result clearly confirms our first hypothesis (WTP≥WTD). 8 Table 3 already indicated that the fiscal-illusion hypothesis is not confirmed by our data. All mean differences reported in Table 4 are insignificant at conventional levels. 9 The test of loss aversion shows that the hypothesis WTP CO2tax >WTP direct is not confirmed at the aggregate level and when only the public-choice scenario is considered. However, the individual-choice scenario exhibits a significant mean difference between direct tax and CO2 tax, but the test exhibits the wrong sign. This could be due to the fact, that the electricity price (which was much higher in the CO2 tax treatment than in the direct tax treatment) was more prominent 10 than the transfer/tax amount.
The test of crowding-out is displayed in Table 5 which contains the correlation between the WTP/WTD and the estimated green electricity tax share. The crowding-out hypothesis is not confirmed for the individual-choice case. This is a reasonable result, because the price mechanism in the individual-choice scenario is not directly related to issues of taxation and public finance. However, a significant crowding-in effect can be identified for the public-choice case (except for the CO2 tax). In order to investigate the relationship between WTD/WTP (measured in Cent/kW h of green electricity) as the endogenous variable and the different treatment variables (representing the 2 x 3 treatment structure) as well as the participants' attitudes and personal characteristics as the exogenous variables, we set up a linear regression model. Table 6 8 WTP≥0 and WTD≥0 are obvious, given the very small standard errors reported in Table 3 . 9 If at all, there is slight evidence for the fiscal illusion in the public-choice scenario in terms that the mean difference is 0.588 cents higher than in the individual choice treatments. Yet, even this difference is insignificant (Welch-test, T=0.635, p=0.528). 10 On the prominence hypothesis see Tversky et al. (1988) .
contains the final results of this regression, that is, we report only those coefficients that turned out to be significant at least at the 10% level. In light of the usual noise in experimental data, the overall fit of the regression (report at the bottom of the table) is satisfactorily high as it explains about half of the variance of the endogenous variable. The regression supports the results obtained from the analysis of treatment effects displayed in Table 4 . The dummy variable for the individual-choice scenario is highly significant. The respective coefficient indicates a large extent of free-riding: the average WTD is more than 3 ct lower than the average WTP assessed in the public-choice scenario. None of the other treatment variables are significant. Consequently, the regression analysis confirms our previous observation that the hypotheses concerning the fiscal illusion and loss aversion have to be rejected.
In Table 5 we reported a significant positive correlation between the average WTP in the public-choice scenario and the estimated tax share for the promotion of green electricity, that is, a crowding-in effect. As noted earlier, this analysis was incomplete, because we did not test for nonlinearities as observed, for example, in an earlier paper by Menges et al. (2005) . We therefore include the estimated tax share as well as its square in the regression analysis. In order to take into account that crowding-in effects were only observed in the public-choice scenario, we interact these two variables with a dummy for the public-choice scenario. The regression analysis confirms the result concerning the linear component, indicating a significant crowding-in effect. Interestingly enough, the coefficient of the squared component is negative, indicating crowding out for higher estimated tax shares. In order to further analyze this, let β denote the estimated tax share in percent for the promotion of green electricity and WTP Δ the differential WTP, that is, the additional WTP that is due to crowding in. Using the figures reported in Table 6 , the differential WTP is given by Hence, we observe crowding in for estimated tax shares smaller than 26.69 % and crowding out for estimated tax shares larger than that value.
The significant variables of the regression model covering sociodemographics are interpreted as follows: WTP/WTD decreases with household size. This observation reflects our remark that the experimental design may induce small (large) households to underestimate (overestimate) the cost of increasing the green electricity share at the national level. Income entered the regression as "OECD equivalent income", that is, the participants' household incomes were adjusted for household size using the OECD equivalence scale in order to allow for intra-household economies of scale.
11 The coefficient is significant and exhibits a positive sign. This result suggests that the participants perceive their contributions to the environment as a superior good. An increase of the equivalent income by 1 Euro increases the average WTP/WTD roughly by 0.001 Cent. The significant negative coefficient of "age squared" indicates that WTP/WTD decreases with increasing age of participants.
Somewhat surprisingly, not belonging to a religious group involves significantly higher payments than being a member of a religious group.
It remains to comment on the participants' attitudes with regard to their influence on WTP/WTD. Individual payments are positively affected by the support of government policies to phase out nuclear energy. Apart from ideological issues, this result reflects economic rationality: WTP/WTD corresponds to the marginal utility of green electricity, which must be higher for those who seek to substitute nuclear by renewable energy. The negative coefficient of the dummy variable "Support liberalization of electricity markets"
highlights that participants exhibiting a negative attitude towards the market reveal higher payments for green electricity. A general distrust towards market mechanism appears also in the negative coefficient of the dummy variable "Costs should be borne by green electricity customers". As pointed out in Section 3.3, participants had to state whether the costs of financing green electricity should be covered by all customers (public-pays), by nonrenewable customers (polluter-pays) or by green electricity customers (benefitor-pays). The regression analysis shows that the proponents of the more market-oriented benefitor principle revealed significantly lower WTP/WTD for green electricity as compared to the other participants.
Summarizing, we find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that people's WTP for green electricity is higher when they decide collectively about the national level of the public good environmental quality and the individual tax burden as compared to a scenario where the promotion of green electricity is done at the individual level. Even although we control for the supply effect of fixing the level of green electricity promotion at the national level in the public-choice scenario, ruling out the possibility to free-ride on the contributions of other individuals increases the willingness-to-pay by more than 3 cents per kW h of green electricity. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that individual payments for green electricity are very sensitive to both general attitudes towards energy taxes and subjective knowledge about the actual tax burden involved by the promotion of green electricity. We find crowding-in as well as crowding-out effects.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an experimental investigation of individual preferences for the consumption of green electricity under alternative payment vehicles for the promotion of renewably energy. The experiment involved a two-factorial design comprising of six different treatments. In the individual-choice scenario participants acted as market participants, while the public-choice scenario was designed as a majority vote on the preferred level of green electricity. Both the individual-choice and the public-choice scenarios were split into three different payment vehicles for the promotion of green electricity: a direct tax, an indirect tax, and a CO2 tax. The experimental design enabled us to investigate the extent of free-riding in the sample, the impact of different payment vehicles on the participants' willingness to pay, and crowding-out effects of private willingness to pay due to public promotion of green electricity.
The data analysis revealed a strong treatment effect concerning the decision mode:
under the public choice treatments, participants were willing to pay far higher contributions to green electricity than under the individual choice treatments. This observation highlights the large extent of free-riding in the private provision of the public good "environmental quality".
On the other hand, it also demonstrates that many household are willing to contribute voluntarily even if free-riding is possible. A standard explanation for this result is impure altruism, that is, people draw additional utility from the very act of giving ("warm glow of giving", Andreoni, 1989) .
Another central result of this study is that we found a nonlinear relationship between the participants' willingness-to-pay and their subjectively estimated tax burden due to the financing of green electricity. Below a certain threshold, participants were willing to spend significantly more on green electricity; above that level the relationship was reversed. Again, a standard explanation for the non-neutrality of taxes is the impure altruism model, where taxes and private contributions are not perceived as perfect substitutes. These results are well in line with an earlier experimental study by Menges et al. (2005) 12 and the empirical literature on charitable donations (see, for example, Brooks, 2000) . The supplementary analysis of the participants' attitudes and characteristics indicated that people who were willing to contribute relatively high amounts to the promotion of green electricity were generally more sceptical with respect to the ability of the market to maximize social welfare.
In contrast to other authors (Sausgruber and Tyran, 2005; Eckel et al., 2005) , we did not find evidence of the fiscal illusion, that is, differences in the perception of indirect and direct taxes. We attribute this result to the fact that we made both taxes very transparent 13 and that we applied a between-participants design. Furthermore, our experimental analysis did not support the loss aversion hypothesis, possibly due to prominence of the price increase in the subsidy treatment.
Combining the results with respect to free-riding, crowding-out effects, and the distrust in the market, the conclusion may be drawn that the private willingness to pay for green electricity is rather limited. This is also reflected in actual green electricity market shares, which are below 2 percent, indicating that not more than 500,000 German customers switched to green electricity suppliers (Sunderer, 2006) . Our experimental evidence indicates that people interpret the promotion of green electricity -the provision and improvement of environmental quality -mainly as a public duty to be financed from tax revenue. Although the "greenness" of electricity products in the last years became a major issue on liberalised energy markets, our results suggest that individuals prefer binding collective contributions rather than individual market-driven activities in this field. This result might be interpreted in light of the more general conclusion of political economy, that voters prefer an improvement of the environment by means of regulations and prohibitions instead of market-driven activities. However, in terms of political economy, voters' behaviour is reducible to a certain kind of cost-illusion, that is, voters prefer regulations because they expect that environmental improvements are to be achieved without reducing the income of the average citizen (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003) . The results of our study doubt this argument of costillusion, because participants were willing to bear a reduction of income when they voted for regulation.
